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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 15353

-v-

MICHAEL PAUL ADA11S,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of
guilty rendered on one count of manslaughter in the Third
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed
or, in the alternative, to have this case remanded for a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Michael Paul Adams, was charged with
one count of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree,
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in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended, (1973), to wit:

That on or about the

21st day of June, 1976, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the said Michael Paul Adams, intending to cause the death of
Charles Roger Goodman, did cause the death of Gerald R.
Braithwaite under the following circumstances:
A.

That he intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Gerald R.
Braithwaite; or

B.

Intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he committed
an act clearly dangerous to human
life that caused the death of
Gerald R. Braithwaite; or

C.

Acting under the circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference
to human life, he recklessly
engaged in conduct which created
a grave risk of death to another
and thereby caused the death of
Gerald R. Braithwaite.

The above-entitled matter came before the court,
sitting with a jury, on the 11th day of July, 1977, before
the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge in the Third Judicial
District, State of Utah.
At the close of appellant's case, the prosecution
announced a rebuttal witness.

The prosecutor then introduced,

through that witness, a self-incriminating statement made by
the appellant to the rebuttal witness, an arresting officer.
Defense counsel objected to the admissibility of the statement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on the grounds that it was unvoluntary and requested a full
hearing in which the trial judge could determine the issue
of voluntariness and admissibility as a matter of law out of
the presence of the jury (Tr. 375).

The trial judge refused

to grant defense counsel's request for a hearing and allowed
only limited voir dire and cross-examination of the arresting
officer and refused defense counsel's motion to allow him to
put on independent evidence and testimony (Tr. 404).
During closing arguments the prosecutor made prejudicial references concerning the appellant's invocation of
the privilege not to have his wife testify (Tr. 483).
After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty
of manslaughter.
Due to the complexity of this case, further facts
will be submitted in the argument portion of this brief as
necessary.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FULL HEARING TO
DETERMINE THE vournTARINESS AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF SELF-INCRIMINATING
STATEMENTS MADE TO THE ARRESTING
OFFICER.
During an in camera proceeding, after defense
counsel had rested and prior to the prosecution's rebuttal,
the prosecution attempted to introduce self-incriminating
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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statements made by the appellant concerning the commission of
the crime charged.

Defense counsel moved to have the trial

judge conduct a hearing to determine, as a matter of law, the
voluntariness and admissibility of the appellant's selfincriminating statements (Tr. 375).

The relevant dialogue is

as follows:
MR. HANSEN: What I would ask the
Court's permission to do is have
that proffer of proof in court out
of the presence of the jury so that
in an attempt to lay a foundation
the error won't creep in before the
objection can be made.
I think we're entitled to have that
proffer of proof in question and
answer form.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that
you're entitled to a proffer of
proof.
MR. HANSEN: Well, I'm making the
motion that we have it in chambers
out of the presence of the jucy in
question and answer form to see if
he can lay the proper foundation.

MR. HANSEN: We're in effect therefore getting everything in there in
front of the jury that could be
avoided for any possible error. If
we had it here first I don't see
any disadvantage to the State. But
I can see a lot of potential damage
to the defendant if we have this in
front of a jury.
I think it's a matter of law
whether or not the Miranda warning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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has been given and whether or
not the answer should be given,
and I think as a matter of law
it should be decided out of the
presence of the jury and not by
the--having foundation and whatnot laid in their presence.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not disposed
to do that, Mr. Hansen. If you've
got some legal authority that
would indicate that that's what
I should do I would be very interested in hearing about it.
(Tr.
377.) (Emphasis added.)
The dialogue continued at a later point as follows:
THE COURT: Well, if you have no
objection to it, Mr. Yocom, I
would do it. But I'm not disposed
to do it.
(Emphasis added.)
Defense counsel at Tr. 394 expressly reiterated its
claim that the Court must have a hearing to determine the
voluntariness of the statement out of the presence of the
jury.
After a lengthy discussion as to the character of
appellant's statements, the Court responded:
Now, I at this point am not prone
to pursue the matter in separate
hearing unless I am furnished with
some law.
(Tr. 396.)
At that point the prosecuting attorney stated that
he was willing to allow the defense counsel to cross-examine

-5-
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the witness, stating:
MR. YOCOM: Your Honor, the State
might comment on what has just
transpired. I would have no
objection whatsoever if Officer
Riet be brought in and subjected
to whatever voir dire, crossexamination or questioning that
counsel desires at this time with
regard to the voluntariness or
sufficiency of Miranda or anything
else.
If there is some question in the
Court's mind as to voluntariness
or anything else, I'm inclined
to submit Mr. Riet to that type
of examination in chambers before
we proceed.
MR. HANSEN: But we want that plus
other witnesses, including the
defendant, as to whether or not
it was voluntary, whether or not
he understood--.
(Emphasis added.)
THE COURT: Well, the problem I'm
faced with Mr. Hansen, is this: I
would assume that in the normal
course of events that if you had
some contrary evidence that the
Court would afford you an opportunity to present that evidence
to the jury.
(Emphasis added.)
Now, I have no intentions of preventing that. But then it gets to
the question of what weight the
jury may give concerning the
matter. And I would assume that
if you think that you're prejudiced
in some way, that you would have
an opportunity if you so desired
to put evidence on in connection
with it.
MR. HANSEN:

But our position,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

your Honor, is that the voluntariness has to be decided as
a matter of law first.
(Emphasis added.)
THE COURT:
I understand what
your position is.
MR. HANSE11:
That's why I want
to take extensive-THE COURT:

Well--.

MR. HANSEN:

--examination out of
the presence of the jury of all
witnesses that are involved in it.
(Tr. 398, 399.)
The Court denied defense counsel's motion, stating:
And the motion made this morning
as to a hearing in connection
with the voluntariness, f~rther
hearing in connection with it is
denied.
(Tr. 404.)
It is therefore clear that the trial court was
under the misconception that the defense counsel was not
entitled to have an independent hearing to determine the
admissibility and voluntariness of appellant's self-incriminating statements.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that where
there is a question as to the voluntariness and admissibility
of self-incriminating statements, the defendant is entitled
as a matter of law to a full hearing outside the presence of
the jury to determine the voluntariness of said statements

-7-
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This was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943).

In that case, the defendant

was convicted of a second degree murder charge based on his
alleged self-incriminating statements.

The court announced

its position that the defendant is entitled to a full hearing
to determine admissibility where the defendant would be afforded
the right to introduce evidence and independent testimony as
follows:
.
. The court will therefore
hear, all competent evidence
offereO:-both by the state and
by the accused, as to the voluntariness of the confession, and
then determine independently of
the jury the competency of the
evidence--that is the voluntariness of the confession--as a
matter of law. This doesriOt
mean merely a prima facie showing
but must satisfy the mind of the
court in the light of all the
evidence given by both state and
defense.
Id. at 185.
(Emphasis
included and added.)
The court further held that once the defendant has
objected to the introduction of self-incriminating statements
based on their inadmissibility and involuntariness, the court
must hear all evidence by both sides, stating:
We hold that the defendant,

~s·a·matter of right, may give

all evidence he has before the
court, pertaining to ~he voluntariness of a confession before

-8-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the confession is received in
evidence; and that the court
must base its ruling on the
competency of the confession
as evidence upon all the testimony on the question adduced
by both state and the defendant.
If on a consideration of all
the evidence on the matter the
court does not find the confession to be voluntary it should
be excluded as incompetent.
To hold otherwise does violence
to the constitutional provision
that an accused may not be
compelled to give evidence
against himself. Id. at 187.
Furthermore, the court held that where a trial
court refuses to hear defendant's evidence on the question of
admissibility, voluntariness, and competency of a defendant's
self-incriminating statements, the trial court commits
reversible error, stating:
. . By thus, in effect, refusing
to hear the defendants' evidence
on the question of whether the confession was involuntary and so incompetent, the court was in error.
Id. at 184.
The Court's holding was founded upon the constitutionally
protected right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I,
Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, and Section 77-1-10,
Utah Code Annotated (1953).
The Supreme Court of the United States, some

-9-
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eleven years after the Crank case, adopted the requirement of
a full independent hearing out of the presence of the jury to
determine voluntariness in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964).

In that case the

appellant appealed his conviction of murder in New York where
the question of voluntariness of a confession was submitted
to a jury.

The appellant had contended that his confession

was involuntary.

On certiorari, the United States Supreme

Court reversed and remanded, stating, among other things, that
the New York statute violated due process of law in that it
did not afford a hearing out of the presence of a jury in
which the judge would determine, as a matter of law, the voluntariness of self-incriminating statements.

The Court stated:

The defendant, objecting to the
admission of a confession, is
entitled to a fair hearing in
which both the underlying factual
issues in the voluntariness of
his confession are actually and
reliably determined. Id. at 380.
The Supreme Court continued its analysis as follows:
At the very least, Townsend v.
Sain 372 U.S. 293, 9 L. Ed. 2d
770, '33 S. Ct. 745, would require
a full evidentiary hearing to
determine the actual context in
which Jackson's confession was
given. Id. at 392.
The Supreme Court further held in Jackson, supra,

-10-
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that states must adopt procedures consistent with that
opinion.

The Court stated that:
. . . These procedures must,
therefore, be fully adequate
to insure a reliable and clearcut determination of the voluntariness of the confession,
including the resolution of
disputed facts upon which the
voluntariness issue may depend.
Id. at 391.
The requirement of the separate states adopting

adequate procedures to resolve this type of issue was further
articulated in Boles v. Stephenson, 379 U.S. 43, 9 L. Ed.2d
109, 84 S. Ct. 174 (1964).

In that case, the appellant

appealed on the grounds that the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals used erroneous standards for determining the voluntariness of an oral admission of guilt and that said admission
was involuntary.

The Court stated:

As we held in Jackson, supra,
where the state defendant has
not been given an adequate
hearing upon the voluntariness
of his confession, he is entitled
to a hearing in the state courts
under appropriate procedures and
standards designed to insure a
full and adequate resolution of
this issue. Id. at 45.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Turner v.
United States, 387 F.2d 333 (1968) reiterated and clarified

-11-
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Jackson in an opinion by Circuit Judge Griffin Bell, stating
that:
The voir dire in connection with
admissibility vel non of oral
admissions, once the issue was
drawn, should have been conducted
outside the presence of the jury.
(Citations omitted.) It is also
reversible error not to permit
the defendant, in such circumstances, to testify on the admissibility, voir dire, and prior
to her case in chief, whether a
confession or admission, oral or
written, be involved. It is then
that a defendant may need to
testify in rebuttal to the prosecution, and, this too, should
take place outside the presence
of the jury. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 334.
The procedures that the Utah Supreme Court has
promulgated to determine the voluntariness of self-incriminating statements clearly meet the Jackson requirements if they
are followed.
In the present case, as in Jackson and Crank, there
was a question raised as to the voluntariness of appellant's
self-incriminating statements.

The appellant's statement

which was in question is as follows:
Well, I had to shoot the man. I
had no choice . . . There was five
of them coming at me all at once
I can handle one or two,
but i can't handle five at once.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The factual basis for appellant's claim of involuntariness was based on the fact that just prior to the time
defendant made the statement, he had been hit in the eye with
an ashtray, completely lacerating his eye from the socket.
It was argued that under such conditions, the appellant was
under such pain as to render the appellant incapable of exercising free will so as not to have the capacity to refrain
from making said statement, thereby making the statement involuntary and its introduction into evidence prejudicial and
by virtue of the fact that appellant was incapable of understanding any Miranda warnings, if in fact they were given.
(See People v. McPherson, 465 P.2d 17, 94 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1970) .)
It is clear that there was a sufficient evidentiary
dispute to require a hearing in the instant case by the trial
judge to determine the issue of admissibility and voluntariness as a matter of law out of the presence of the jury.
Therefore, the trial court's failure to grant the
appellant a full hearing where he would be entitled to introduce independent evidence and testimony to enable the judge
to adequately determine, as a matter of law, out of the
presence of the jury, the admissibility and competency of
self-incriminating statements violated Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as interpreted by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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State v. Crank, supra, Jackson, supra, Boles, supra, Turner,
supra, and Section 77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

By

refusing the requested hearing, the court committed prejudicial
and reversible error requiring this court to reverse the
appellant's conviction or, in the alternative, to have his
case remanded for a new trial.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL
COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
CONCERNING THEIR DUTY TO DETERMINE THE
WEIGHT Al.'\ID CREDIBILITY TO BE GIVEN TO
ARRESTING OFFICER'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE APPELLANT'S SELF-INCRIMINATING
STATEMENTS.
The trial judge erred in failing to meet his affirmative obligation to specifically instruct the jury that it is
within their province to determine what weight and credibility
they should give to the arresting officer's testimony concerning the appellant's self-incriminating statements.
It is well settled in Utah law that once the judge
has held a full hearing, is satisfied by the evidence, and has
determined as a matter of law that a self-incriminating statement by the defendant is voluntary, competent, and admissible
(discussed, supra), he must then give to the jury an instruction that it is their duty to determine what weight and credibility to give such self-incriminating statement.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this point in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) when Justice Wade,
writing for the majority, stated:
. . . We agree with the rule
approved in those cases, that a
confession is not admissible in
evidence unless it was voluntarily
made; that this question must be
determined by the court from all
of the evidence from both sides
bearing thereon; that if the court
is satisfied from the evidence
that the confession was voluntary,
then the court admits the confession in evidence to the jury,
together with all of the evidence
on the question of whether it was
voluntary, and the circumstances
surrounding its being made, and
from such evidence the jury must
determine the weight and credibility
to be given it, but may not determine
its competency as evidence, that
beinE a question for the court.
Id. at 196.
The Crank decision was reiterated by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Allen, 505 P.2d 302, 29 Utah 2d 88
(1973).

The court stated:
. If the court thereafter
determines from the evidence that
the confession was voluntary, it
admits the confession in evidence
to the jury, together with all of
the evidence on the question of
whether it was voluntary including
the surrounding circumstances at
the time it was made. The jury
must determine the weight and
credibility to be given to such
evidence, but the jury may not
determine its competency as

-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence, which is strictly a question for the court. Id. at 304.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held the above position to be the requirement in Utah courts in the cases of
State v. Mares, 192 P.2d 861 (Utah 1948) and State v. Warwick,
11 Utah 2d 116, 355 P.2d 703 (1960).
In the present case, the trial judge gave no evidence or instructions to the jury as to the voluntariness of
appellant's self-incriminating statements, nor did he give
them the surrounding circumstances in which they were made.
The trial judge merely gave a stock instruction on the jury's
right to determine what credence to give the testimony of
witnesses generally.

Utah law requires a specific instruction

that the jurors have the power to decide what weight and
credibility they wish to give testimony concerning defendant's
self-incriminating statements.
In the case of State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296
P.2d 726 (1956), after the court quoted the language from
Crank, supra, quoted above, laying down the position that
after the judge determined admissibility, the jury determines
weight and credibility, the court went on to say that the
court had an affirmative obligation to instruct the jury on
the above standard.

The court stated:

. . . the jury should be
instructed to consider such
-16-
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evidence for the purpose of
determining what weight should
be given to it.
Id. at 732.
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore the trial court in the instant case committed prejudicial error on two grounds:
1.

The court failed to meet its
affirmative obligation to give to
the jury specific instructions on
the jury's duty and power to
determine what weight and credibility to give the arresting
officer's testimony concerning
appellant's self-incriminating
statements recorded in his written
report, and

2.

The court erred in not giving to
the jury any evidence or instructions concerning whether or not
the statements were voluntary,
nor any evidence as to the surrounding circumstances in which
the statements were made.

The trial judge's action clearly is in violation of
the requirements of Crank, Ashdown, Warwick, and Allen, all
supra.
POINT III
THE PROSECUITON VIOLATED APPEil.ANT'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS WELL AS HIS OONSTITITTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY :rn HIS
OWN BEHALF, BY FAILING TO DISCLOSE TO
DEffi~SE COUNSEL PRIOR TO TRIAL, THE SUBSTAi.'lCE OF, AI'ID HIS rnTENTION TO USE , SELF IHCRIMINATING STATEMENTS HADE BY THE
APPELLANT AND REOORDED BY A..RRESTJNG
OFFICER.

-17-
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The prosecution violated appellant's constitutionally
protected right not to testify in his own behalf as embodied
in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution; Section
77-1-10, Utah Code

Annotat~d;

the Due Process Clause, Article I,

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by failing to disclose
to defense counsel that the prosecution had in its possession
a written recording made by the arresting officer of a selfincriminating statement of the defendant made during his arrest
at the scene of the alleged crime.
Defense counsel had informally requested from the
prosecution all evidence that he intended to use at trial.
Further, at the preliminary hearing there was no mention by
the prosecution that he either had in his possession or intended to use at trial the arresting officer's written recording of appellant's self-incriminating statement.

It was only

after defendant had elected to take the stand to testify on
his own behalf that the prosecution, on rebuttal, attempted
to introduce the written recording of appellant's self-incriminating statements.

It was only at this point that defense

counsel was made aware of such statements.
Defense counsel objected on the basis of surprise
and requested a hearing to determine the competency of the
evidence as more fully discussed in Point I.

The statement

was admitted over appellant's objection.
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The prosecutor's failure to disclose the existence
of the statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct, constituted unfair surprise, and violated appellant's right not
to testify in his own behalf.
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to
the Administration of Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, Part II.

Disclosure to Accused§ 2.1,

Prosecutor's Obligation requires the prosecution to disclose
to defense counsel any written or recorded statement made by
defendant in his possession.

The appropriate portion of the

standard reads as follows:
2.1

Prosecutor's obligation

(a)
. the prosecuting attorney
shall disclose to defense counsel
the following material and information
within his possession or control:
(ii) any written or recorded
statements and substance of
any oral statements made by
the accused .
The prosecution clearly violated this standard by
failing to disclose either the existence or substance of the
written recording of defendant's oral statement, thereby
committing prosecutorial misconduct.
The United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit placed a due process requirement on the prosecution's duty to disclose in the case of United States v.
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Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (1972).

The Circuit Judge, J. Skelly

Wright, writing for the court, stated that requiring the government to disclose evidence to the defendant "would make the
trial more of a 'quest for truth' than a 'sporting event.'"
Id. at 644.
The court announced its position concerning prosecutorial disclosure and the standards to be used when it stated:
It is the law in this circuit that
the due process requirement applies
to all evidence which might have
led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt,
and that this test is to be applied
generously to the accused when there
is 'substantial room for doubt' as
to what effect disclosure might have
had. Id. at 648.
Further, the court stated that the due process requirement of disclosure by prosecution did not only apply to
evidence that was favorable to the defendant, but to all such
evidence that was "crucial to the question of appellant's
guilt or innocence."

Id. at 649.

The court announced the purpose for this requirement
when it stated:
The purpose of the duty is not
simply to correct an imbalance
of advantage whereby the prosecution may surprise the defense at
trial with new evidence, rather,
it is also to make of the trial a
search for truth informed by all
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relevant material, much of
which, because of imbalance in
investigative resources, will
be exclusively in the hands of
the Government.
Id. at 648.
Therefore, in the instant case, the prosecution
clearly breached this standard, thereby violating appellant's
right to due process of law.
The Court of Appeals for the Third District of
California in the case of People v. Superior Court, in and
for the County of Shasta, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968), in deciding
the question of pretrial discovery, stated:
Prior to trial, a defendant is
entitled to obtain written
statements made by him to police
officers . . . Obviously, the
same rule applies to oral statements made to the police.
Id. at
483.
(Citations omitted.)
Therefore it is clear that in the present case the
prosecution had a duty to disclose to the defense counsel that
the prosecution had in its possession and intended to use selfincriminating statements made by the defendant to the arresting
officer, preserved in the officer's investigative report that
was within the exclusive possession and control of the prosecution.

The prosecution's failure to disclose such to defense

counsel until after appellant had testified in his own behalf
abridged appellant's right to elect not to testify and violated
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the due process clause of the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of Utah.
POINT IV
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT TOGETHER WITH
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO ADMONISH
THE JURY CONCERNING THE APPELLANT'S WIFE'S
FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND DENIED APPEllA'IT
HIS STATUIORY Al.'ID CONSTITIITIONAL RIGHT NOT TO
HAVE HIS WIFE TESTIFY.
At the close of the trial, during the prosecution's
closing arguments, the prosecution made prejudicial references
to appellant's wife's failure to testify at trial.

The preju-

dicial remark is as follows:
He warned Carol over the phone.
Could have--he said he talked to
her.
'Well, she's coming over.'
What did he tell her? He could
tell her, 'Carol, don't come.
I think Charlie's got a gun and by
God he's going to come in here and
kill you. You're crazy for coming.'
Well, we don't know what he told her.
I su ose we 11 never know what he
said to his wi e.
Emphasis added.)
(Tr. 483.)
This is clearly prosecutorial misconduct in violation
of Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, Utah
Code Annotated, Section 77-1-10, and Rule 39 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 39, dealing with
reference to exercise of privilege states:
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If a privilege is exercised not to
testify or to prevent another from
testifying, either in the action
or with respect to particular
matters, or to refuse to disclose
or to prevent another from disclosing any matter, the judge and
counsel may not conunent thereon,
no inference shall arise with
respect to the exercise of the
privilege, and the trier of fact
may not draw any adverse inference
therefrom. In those jury cases
wherein the right to exercise a
privilege, as herein provided, may
be misunderstood and unfavorable
inferences drawn by the trier of
fact, or be impaired in the particular case, the court, at the request
of the party exercising the privilege, may instruct the jury in
support of such privilege.
The prosecutor's misconduct, being in violation of
the constitution, statutes, and Rules of Evidence of Utah is
clearly error.

However, it is possible for the trial judge

to correct this error by a timely and adequate admonition to
the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statements and in
support of the privileges not to testify at trial.

However,

in the present case, the trial judge refused defendant's motion
for mistrial and in no way admonished the jury to disregard
prosecutor's statement.

(Tr. 538.)

The prosecutor's conunent and the judge's failure to
admonish the jury constituted a substantial impairment and
disparaged defendant's right to claim the privilege not to
have his wife testify at trial.
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Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963), the defendant was
convicted of a rape.

His defense was alibi in that he was

home with his wife at the time of the offense.

The court held

that it was prejudicial error for prosecuting attorney to
comment to the jury on defendant's wife's failure to testify.
The court reversed with directions to grant a new trial.

The

court stated:
The district attorney's comment to
the jury in substance, that the
defendant's wife, the one person
who could have testified that
defendant was at home at the time
the assault occurred did not
testify, was prejudicial error.
Id. at 932.
The court was concerned in that letting prosecutors
refer to the invocation of the privilege would in effect destroy
or impair the privilege.

The court stated:

The cases are in hopeless confusion
whether
such comment on the
failure to testify is prejudicial
error. If such comment is permissible, the privilege is largely
destroyed. We conclude that this comIIEnt destroyed the privilege to not testify
and was prejudicial.
Id. at 932.

The standard for determining whether or not a comment
by the prosecutor is improper and therefore error was set out
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in State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972).

In

that case, defendant was found guilty of second degree murder
and appealed on the grounds that the prosecutor made references to the invocation of the privilege to have his wife not
testify.

The court set out the standard when it stated:
That any conunent by the prosecutor
which in a substantial way will
impair or disparage a claim of
privilege is improper and therefore is error; and that if it be
such that there is a possibility
that it prejudiced the defendant,
in the sense that there is any
likelihood that there may have
been a different result, then
the error should be deemed prejudicial and another trial granted.
Although the court in the Trusty case affirmed the

lower court's findings of no error, it did so on two grounds .
. . First, there was no objection upon which the court could
act until after the defendant had
answered the question. The
second, if there had been any
implication adverse to the defendant, the trial judge gave an
appropriate cautionary instruction which it should be assumed
that conscientious jurors would
follow. Id. at 114, 115.
In the present case, the harm was committed by the
inference that the jurors could have drawn from the prosecution's remarks and, second, by the judge's failure to cure
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any possible adverse implication by an appropriate cautionary
instruction or admonition.

The comment by the prosecutor,

having gone unchecked and uncorrected by an appropriate cautionary instruction or admonition by the trial judge, denied
appellant his constitutionally and statutorily protected right
to claim the privilege of having one's wife not testify at
trial and therefore the error should be deemed prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
The appellant seeks reversal or, in the alternative,
to have the case remanded for new trial based upon the following grounds:
A.

The trial court's refusal to grant
the appellant a full hearing where
he could introduce independent
evidence and testimony as well as
cross-examine any witnesses introduced by the prosecution for the
purpose of determining the voluntariness and admissibility of selfincriminating statements violated
the appellant's constitutionally
protected right against selfincrimination and due process under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 12 of the
Constitution of Utah.
The admission into evidence of the
incriminating statement made by the
appellant without be~ef~t.of said.
hearing was both prejudicial and in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights as interpreted by the
courts under Crank, Boles, and
Jackson.

-26Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

The trial judge cormnitted prejudicial error by failing to specifically instruct the jury
concerning their power and duty
to determine what weight and
credibility they wish to give
to the arresting officer's
test~nony as to appellant's
self-incriminating statement as
well ~s his failure to give to
the jury all relevant evidence
concerning the voluntariness of
the statements and evidence as
to the surrounding circumstances
under which the statements were
made, this being in conflict
with the requirements for a fair
trial set down by the Utah
Supreme Court in Crank, Allen,
Mares, Warwick, ASfidOWn, supra,
and in violation of due process
of law.

C.

The prosecution violated appellant's right to <lue process of
law as embodied in Article I,
Section 7 of the Constitution of
Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,
as well as appellant's constitutional right not to testify in
his own behalf as embodied in
Article I, Section 12 of the
Constitution of Utah and Section
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, by
failing to disclose to defense
counsel that the prosecution had
in its possession a written recording of appellant's selfincriminating statements made to
arresting officers introduced and
disclosed during rebuttal after
appellant had testified in his
own behalf and had rested his
case.

D.

Appellant's constitutional right
not to have his wife testify at
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trial as embodied in Article I,
Section 12 of the Constitution of
Utah; Section 77-1-10, Utah Code
Annotated; and Rule 39 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence was substantially impaired by the prosecution
cormnenting to the jury concerning
the failure of the appellant's
wife to testify and by the trial
judge's failure to correct the
error through a timely admonition
to the jury to disregard the
prosecution's statement as required by Brown and Trusty, supra.
Wherefore, appellant respectfully prays that the
court reverse his conviction or, in the alternative, that this
case be remanded for new trial.
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